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I. INTRODUCTION
The controversial subject of landlord liability for crimes com-
mitted by third parties on the apartment premises has been the
subject of much debate. The discussion has produced a scattering
of opinions rather than one settled rule. Not all jurisdictions agree
that a landlord should be held liable to his tenants for crimes on
the premises. Even jurisdictions that do hold landlords liable for
such crimes disagree on the basis for liability. Some courts ground
their decisions in contract. Other courts conjure landlord liability
out of an implied warranty of habitability. Still other courts im-
pose landlord liability for third party crimes on the basis of tort
principles.
The dust kicked up by the debate, however, should not cloud
the issues. The very nature of the disagreement has clarified the
direction that the courts should take. The emergence of a new
standard for judging landlord liability is a milestone in the devel-
opment of American law, but must be recognized uniformly to
bring stability to this area of the law. This Note advocates that
courts should base their decisions concerning a landlord's liability
for crimes committed by third parties on tort principles rather
than on contract or implied warranty of habitability theories. Part
II of this Note focuses on property and tort law principles that
have shaped landlord liability in general. The Note considers only
the case of the urban apartment landlord and tenant. Part III ex-
amines the tort, implied warranty of habitability, and contract the-
ories upon which courts base landlord liability for third party
crimes. Part IV analyzes these different principles and concludes
that courts should rely on the tort theory as the basis for landlord
liability to tenants for crimes committed by third parties on the
premises. Finally, part IV concludes that, in applying tort princi-
ples, courts should use a rebuttable presumption of landlord negli-
gence. This presumption should arise once the tenant has shown
injuries from a foreseeable crime committed on the premise by a
third party who gained entrance through a common area.
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II. THE LEGAL HISTORY: PROPERTY AND TORT PRINCIPLES THAT
HAVE SHAPED THE LANDLORD'S RESPONSIBILITIES
A. Common-Law Origins of the Landlord-Tenant Relationship
At common law a lease of land was a conveyance.' The land-
lord gave the tenant possession of the land in exchange for rent.2
Both landlord and tenant were concerned primarily with profitable
agricultural use of the leasehold. Consequently, any residential
use of the land was incidental. Because the common law deemed
the lease a conveyance of land, the tenant had complete dominion
over the leasehold.4 The landlord retained no control over the land;
indeed, under common law the landlord was a trespasser if he en-
tered the leasehold.5 Virtually the only limit on the tenant's rights,
as long as he paid rent, was that he not commit waste. Because
the tenant had exclusive control of the land, he made all repairs
that the property required.7 The condition of a residential building
on the leasehold was unimportant to the landlord, whose only in-
terest was to collect the rent."
As commerce developed and towns grew, the divergence be-
tween the town resident and the agrarian country dweller grew.9 In
1. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *317: "A lease is properly a conveyance of any
lands or tenements (usually in consideration of rent or other annual recompense) made for
life, for years, or at will. . . ." Pollock and Maitland emphasize that a lease at common law
was not a contract, even though a landlord's action to recover rent might appear to be an
action on a contract:
We here have no enforcement of an obligation; we have the recovery of a thing. Of
course between landlord and tenant there often is an obligation of the most sacred kind
[feudal homage] .... The landlord who demands the rent that is in arrear is not
seeking to enforce a contract, he is seeking to recover a thing.
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 127 (1895); see Lesar, The
Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status to Contract and Back in 900
Years?, 9 KAN. L. REv. 369 (1961).
2. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *318-19.
3. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 221[1] (1983). "Anciently the greater
part of rents were reserved in provisions; in corn, in poultry, and the like; till the use of
money became more frequent." 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *318.
4. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *317-22; T. PLUcKNETF, A CoNcIsE HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW 599 (1st Am. ed. 1923).
5. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *317-22.
6. 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 67 (1st Am. ed. Philadelphia
1812).
7. Id. One court has stated that the medieval tenant handily made repairs, for he was
a "'jack-of-all-trades' farmer ... who often remained on one piece of land for his entire
life." Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
8. See supra text accompanying note 2.
9. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 269 (1923).
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medieval England lawmakers recognized that the laws governing
agrarian land interests were not appropriate to govern the houses
and shops located in towns.10 Lawmakers, realizing that the good
repair of town buildings was "necessary to the safety of the com-
munity,"" developed borough customs 2 that strictly regulated the
maintenance of leased land and structures. 13 Although overlooked
by most commentators, these borough customs are critically impor-
tant to modern courts' considerations of landlord liability because
borough customs show that even early English law required differ-
ent maintenance of leased premises depending on the location and
nature of the leased property. 4
B. The Expansion of Landlord Liability in Tort
Courts in the United States generally followed England's rules
regarding a landlord's duties to his agrarian tenants. As the pri-
mary use of land turned from agricultural to residential, however,
urban realities forced courts to reevaluate the landlord's responsi-
bilities.15 These urban realities included increased crimes, which is
"an inescapable fact of modern life,"' 6 the tenant's inability to in-
stall security devices in the common areas of an apartment build-
ing, 7 and the landlord's exclusive control over security measures in
the building.' Courts began to hold landlords liable to tenants for
negligent conduct in a growing number of situations. For example,
the landlord faced possible liability if he entered a short term lease
10. Id.
11. Id. at 272.
12. Borough customs, codified rules that regulated town life, contained rules which
were the predecessors of today's housing codes.
13. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 9, at 269-75.
14. Id. at 269. Although borough customs are the forerunners of today's housing codes,
borough customs differ in one respect- they required the tenant, not the landlord, to make
repairs because the tenant was deemed to have control of the property. Id. at 272. The
tenant of today's urban apartment, however, does not control the premises. See, e.g., Kline
v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 480, 484, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1970); O'Hara v.
Western Seven Trees Corp, 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 802, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487, 489-90 (1978);
Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, -, 449 N.E.2d 331, 335 (1983); Trentacost
v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 226, 412 A.2d 436, 442 (1980); see also Peterson v. San Francisco
Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, -, 685 P.2d 1193, 1202, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842, 851
(1984).
15. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-80 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
16. Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 227, 412 A.2d 436, 443 (1980).
17. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
18. Id.
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but failed to deliver habitable quarters, 19 if a latent defect existed
in the land,20 if the landlord agreed to repair the premises but
failed to do so,2 1 if he leased the land for public use,2 2 or if the
landlord retained control over part of the premises.23 Thus social
and cultural changes in the United States motivated the courts to
broaden the scope of the landlord's liability beyond what it was at
common law.
2 4
In evaluating the development of modern landlord and tenant
law, most commentators have examined only briefly the common-
law treatment of innkeepers.2 5 This area of law, however, is critical
to an understanding of the principles on which modern landlord
and tenant law is based. The innkeeper, not the medieval landlord,
is the counterpart of the modern urban landlord. 6 Early common-
law courts imposed little if any duty on innkeepers .2  Over time,
19. See Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892).
20. See Miner, Read & Garrette v. McNamara, 81 Conn. 690, 72 A. 138 (1909);
Andonique v. Carmen, 151 Ky. 249, 151 S.W. 921 (1912); Baird v. Ellsworth Realty Co., 265
S.W.2d 770 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
21, See Ashmun v. Nichols, 92 Or. 223, 178 P. 234 (1919); see also Dunson v. Fried-
lander Realty Co., 369 So. 2d 792 (Ala. 1979); Roesler v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 2 Ill. App. 2d
54, 118 N.E.2d 621 (1954); Bauer v. 141-149 Cedar Lane Holding Co., 24 N.J. 139, 130 A.2d
833 (1957); Woods v. Forest Hill Cemetary, 183 Tenn. 413, 192 S.W.2d 987 (1946); Damron
v. C.R. Anthony Co., 586 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
22, See Swords v. Edgar, 59 N.Y. 28 (1874) (owner of pier must keep it in reasonably
safe condition); O'Toole v. Thousand Island Park Ass'n, 206 A.D. 31, 200 N.Y.S. 502 (1923)
(owner of park must keep sidewalks reasonably safe).
23. See Hinthorn v. Benfer, 90 Kan. 744, 136 P. 247 (1913) (landlord controlled porch
and so was held liable for tenant's death, which occurred when a railing she leaned against
gave way); McNab v. Wallin, 133 Minn. 370, 158 N.W. 623 (1916) (because landlord was
responsible for repair of building step, he was held liable for tenant's falling from wobbly
step); Inglehart v. Mueller, 156 Wis. 609, 146 N.W. 808 (1914) (hall was within landlord's
control, so landlord held liable for boy's death caused by falling radiator in hall); see also
Goodman v. Smith, 340 Mass. 336, 164 N.E.2d 130 (1960) (landlord controlled attic, so land-
lord held liable for injuries tenant received because of faulty attic floor); Lipsitz v. Schecter,
377 Mich. 685, 142 N.W.2d 1 (1966) (because landlord controlled window screen fastenings,
he was liable to tenant hit by a falling screen); Hellon v. Trotwood Apartments, Inc., 62
Tenn. App. 203, 460 S.W.2d 372 (1970) (landlord liable for tenant's fall on mud on sidewalk
that accumulated because of faulty drainage system).
24. For an excellent discussion of the expanded scope of landlord liability, see Note,
Lessor's Duty to Repair: Tort Liability to Persons Injured on the Premises, 62 HARv. L.
REv. 669 (1949).
25. The Javins court explored the similarities between the modern landlord and the
common-law innkeeper. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 n.33 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
26. See, e.g., id. For a discussion of the innkeeper's duty to protect his guests, see
Mustad v. Swedish Brethren, 83 Minn. 40, 85 N.W. 913 (1901); Rommel v. Schambacher,
120 Pa. 579, 11 A. 779 (1887); Gurren v. Casperson, 147 Wash. 257, 265 P. 472 (1928).
27. Cayle's Case, 8 Coke 32a, 77 Eng. Rep. 520 (1584) ("if the guest be beaten in the
inn, the innkeeper shall not answer for it").
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however, the law imposed a heightened standard of care on keepers
of inns, the only multiple dwelling structures known at common
law.2 8 This special duty was justifiable because the innkeeper could
not expect guests to make necessary repairs due to the temporary
nature of the guests' stay at the inn.2 9 More importantly, the inn-
keeper controlled the common areas of the inn. The modern urban
landlord's similar control over the premises of urban apartment
buildings makes him more like the innkeeper than the agrarian
landlord.,30 Nevertheless, for years the common law categorized
leases as conveyances even though the apartment lease resembled
the innkeeper's contract more than the agrarian landlord's lease.
31
C. The Expansion of Landlord Liability for Crimes of Third
Parties
With the general expansion of landlord liability, tenants began
to seek relief in the courts for crime in urban apartment buildings.
Some courts imposed liability on landlords for third party crimes
committed against tenants on the premises.
In Goldberg v. Housing Authority 2 two men assaulted and
robbed a milkman33 in the elevator of an apartment complex. The
milkman sued the landlord for failing to furnish police protec-
tion.3 4 The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that a residential
landlord has no duty to provide police protection. The court rea-
soned that a landlord should not have to perform a job that "must
be left with the duly constituted police forces."3 5 In dicta, however,
the court noted that a landlord may be liable for theft by an in-
truder if the landlord's failure to secure property within his control
"carelessly enables a thief to gain entrance to the apartment of the
tenant."' The court did not hold the landlord liable in negligence
28. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 n.33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). Similarly, common carriers owe a special standard of care to their
passengers. Although the facts of the common carrier cases differ from the innkeeper cases,
the increased duty that courts impose upon common carriers and landlords is based upon
the element of control, see Quigley v. Wilson Line, 338 Mass. 125, 154 N.E.2d 77 (1958), and
superior knowledge of risks, see Neering v. Illinois Central R.R., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497
(1943).
29. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1077 n.33.
30. Id.
31. See Lesar, supra note 1, at 372-77.
32. 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
33. The milkman was not a tenant.
34. Goldberg, 38 N.J. at 579-80, 186 A.2d at 291.
35. Id. at 591, 186 A.2d at 298.
36. Id. at 588, 186 A.2d at 296.
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for the third party's crime because negligence had not been an is-
sue in the trial court proceedings.3
The court in Kendall v. Gore Properties"3 held a landlord lia-
ble for the strangling death of an apartment tenant. The landlord
had hired a man with mental health problems and violent tenden-
cies to paint the tenant's apartment. The landlord had made no
inquiries into the man's background, yet allowed him free access to
the tenant's apartment with no supervision. Because the landlord
had acted unreasonably in hiring the painter, the court concluded
that the landlord had breached his duty to exercise reasonable care
to prevent harm to tenants.3 9 Kendall is weak precedent for land-
lord liability to tenants for third party crimes because the court
relied heavily on the "latent defect" doctrine 0 and the fact that
the landlord himself had hired the painter without even a mini-
mum investigation of his background. The case, nevertheless, is
significant because it weakened the common-law rule under which
a landlord had no duty to protect his tenant from crime.
In Ramsay v. Morisette41 the court held a landlord liable for
injuries a tenant received when an intruder broke into her apart-
ment and assaulted her. The court based its decision on the land-
lord's failure to use reasonable care to secure the common areas of
the building. The court relied upon evidence that the landlord had
failed to install locks in the building and had allowed transients to
sleep in the hallways.42 Moreover, the court found that the land-
lord had known of criminal activity in the building, but had failed
to notify the police or the tenants. The Ramsay court, therefore,
applied the traditional reasonableness analysis of landlord liability
to cover the maintenance of security in common areas. 3
In Johnston v. Harris44 the Michigan Supreme Court ruled
that a tenant who had been assaulted in the poorly lit, unlocked
lobby of an apartment building had a cause of action against his
landlord. The court found that the landlord's breach of his duty to
provide reasonably safe common areas could have been the cause
37. Id. at 580 n.1, 186 A.2d at 291 n.1.
38. 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
39. Id. at 680.
40. The court found that the landlord himself had created the "latent defect" by giv-
ing the painter keys to the apartment of a young woman who lived alone. Id. at 678, 680.
41. 252 A.2d 509 (D.C. 1969).
42. Id. at 512.
43. See id. at 513.
44. 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972).
1985]
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of the tenant's harm.4
Thus, courts have recognized that a landlord may be liable to
a tenant for the crimes of third parties. The dicta in Goldberg left
a door open for consideration of traditional negligence standards in
assessing landlord liability for third party crimes. Moreover,
Kendall, Ramsay, and Johnston, which held landlords liable for
third party crimes, signify an expansion of the scope of landlord
liability based upon traditional negligence principles. Although
these cases stood alone for several years, they indicated judicial
willingness to expand landlord liability and foreshadowed the de-
velopment of still other theories of landlord liability.
D. The Lease as Contract: Housing Codes
The 1970 landmark decision in Javins v. First National Re-
alty Corp.46 recognized that a lease requires a landlord to deliver a
package of services as well as possession of the premises.47 The
Javins court recognized that the twentieth century landlord is
more like the common-law innkeeper than the agrarian landlord.48
The court reasoned that the modern day lease requires more than
a mere transfer of land. The tenant demands and the lease re-
quires that the landlord transfer a "well known package of goods
and services," which includes adequate maintenance and upkeep.49
The court concluded that it should interpret a lease like any other
contract.5
In analyzing the lease contract, the Javins court found that
the lease had created an implied warranty of habitability.51 The
45. Under the circumstances of the case, this duty included providing adequate light-
ing and door locks. Id. at 572-73, 198 N.W.2d at 409-10. The court reversed the lower court's
summary judgment ruling in favor of the landlord and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 576,
198 N.W.2d at 411.
46. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
47. In Javins the landlord sued to recover unpaid rent. As an equitable defense the
tenants alleged that the landlord had violated the District of Columbia Housing Regula-
tions. The court ruled that the landlord's violations could suspend the tenants' duty to pay
rent. Id. at 1082.
48. The court stated: "[The common law's assumption that] a lease primarily con-
veyed to the tenant an interest in land may have been reasonable in a rural, agrarian society
.... But in the case of the modern apartment dweller, the value of the lease is that it gives
him a place to live." Id. at 1074. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the development of common-law attitudes toward the landlord-tenant relationship.
49. 428 F.2d at 1074. According to the court, "[the] package. . . includes not merely
walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facili-
ties, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance." Id.
50. Id. at 1075.
51. Id. at 1077.
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court based the warranty upon housing code requirements52 and
the nature of the urban housing market.53 The court held that the
tenant justifiably could withhold rent if he could show that the
apartment conditions violated the implied warranty of habitabil-
ity.4 Thus, Javins discarded concepts applicable to medieval agra-
rian life and adopted standards that fit the modern day landlord-
tenant relationship.
The Javins court's reliance on housing code requirements to
imply a duty of due care running from landlord to tenant was an
expansion of the scope of landlord liability that some courts have
been quick to limit. In Williams v. Davis55 the court held that te-
nants could not withhold rent because of the landlord's failure to
take crime prevention measures. The court determined that the
housing regulations' requirement of safety did not obligate a land-
52. The housing codes imposed specific requirements on landlords and exacted penal-
ties from nonconforming landlords. A majority of states have enacted legislation recognizing
implied warranties of habitability. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100, .160-.190 (1979); ARiZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 33-1324 (Supp. 1983); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941-42 (West Supp. 1984); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-7 to -12 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5303 (1974);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.51, .55-.56 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-13 (1983); HAWAII
REv. STAT. §§ 521-42 (Supp. 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 383.595, .625, .635, .640, .645, .655
(Supp. 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (1980 & Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 239, § 8A (West Supp. 1984); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN § 554.139 (Supp. 1984); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1419, -1425 (1981); NEv. REV.
STAT. § 118A.290, .360 (1977); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 10-6.6(d)(7) (1968); N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAW § 235-b (Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-42a (Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-
13.1 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (Page 1981 & 1983); OR. REv. STAT. § 91.770
(1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-16 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-40-101 to -105 (1983) (ap-
plies to major cities only); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4859 (1973); VA. CODE §§ 55-248.13, .23
(1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (West Supp. 1984); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 704.07
(West 1981).
Courts have ruled that a landlord's violation of the implied warranty of habitability
justified a tenant's withholding rent. Lemle v. Breeden, 12 Ariz. App. 321, 462 P.2d 470
(1979); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974);
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d
791 (Iowa 1972); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Kline v. Burns,
111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 343
N.Y.S.2d 406 (Civ. Ct. 1973); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
53. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1076-77. The court emphasized that today's urban housing
market requires a reevaluation of traditional landlord-tenant law. In contrast to the fre-
quent lifelong rural lease for agricultural purposes, the urban apartment lease does not con-
vey land, but rather a "house suitable for occupation." Id. at 1078. Because of economic,
time, or legal constraints, urban tenants often are unable to make needed repairs. In addi-
tion, urban tenants have little bargaining power because of general urban housing shortages
and, therefore, "have very little leverage to enforce demands for better housing." Id. at
1079.
54. Id. at 1082-83.
55. 275 A.2d 231 (D.C. 1971).
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lord to install locks, window bars, floodlights, or other protection
from crime. The court stated that the housing regulations' use of
the words "safe" and "safety" referred to safety from structural
defects, unsanitary conditions, and fire hazards and did not apply
to safety from criminal acts of third parties. 6
The Williams ruling effectively limited landlord liability
under Javins to structural safety. Although the housing codes did
not necessarily make landlords responsible for crimes on the prem-
ises, the codes did change the way courts viewed residential
leases.5 7 Thus, the housing codes laid the groundwork for changes
in landlord and tenant law.
III. THE LIABILITY DECISIONS: TORT,
WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY, OR CONTRACT
Against this background, tenants brought suits seeking to hold
landlords liable for crimes committed by third parties.6 Courts be-
gan to hand down decisions imposing greater landlord liability.
The courts based this increased liability upon several different
standards, primarily relying upon tort, implied warranty of habita-
bility, and contract principles.
A. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.: Tort
In Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.59
the tenant sued her landlord to recover for injuries suffered when
she was assaulted and robbed in the hallway outside her apartment
in Washington, D.C. When the plaintiff had moved into the apart-
ment, a twenty-four hour doorman and two guards protected the
building, and its side entrances were either guarded or locked. At
the time of the assault the guards were no longer on duty and the
56. Id. at 232.
57. For further discussion of this issue, see Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes
and Tenant Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1976); Bazyler, The Duty to Pro-
vide Adequate Protection: Landowners' Liability for Failure to Protect Patrons from Crim-
inal Attack, 21 ARIz. L. REv. 726 (1979); Browder, Taming of a Duty - The Tort Liability
of Landlords, 81 MICH. L. REv. 99 (1982); Henszey and Weisman, What is the Landlord's
Responsibility for Criminal Acts Committed on the Premises? 6 REAL EST. L.J. 104 (1977);
Quinn and Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the Past with
Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225 (1969).
58. Crime is increasingly a part of life in this country. FBI criminal statistics for 1982
show 21,012 murders (9.1 per 100,000 people); 77,763 rapes (33.6 per 100,000 people);
536,888 robberies (231.9 per 100,000 people); 650,042 aggravated assaults (280.8 per 100,000
people); 3,415,540 burglaries (1,475.2 per 100,000 people); 7,107,663 thefts (3,069.8 per
100,000 people). 1982 FBI UNIFORM CRIME REPS. 6-27 (1983).
59. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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outside doors had been unlocked.6 0 In the months before the plain-
tiff was attacked, tenants had asked the landlord to restore secur-
ity protection to counter recurring crime in the area.61 The court
held the landlord liable, reasoning that a landlord owes the tenant
of an urban apartment a duty of protection, especially in the areas
that the landlord controls.2 The court based its ruling in tort, rec-
ognizing two sources of the landlord's duty: (1) foreseeability of the
crime and (2) the obligation "implied in the contract between
landlord and tenant . . . to provide those protective measures
which are within his reasonable capacity.
'63
The landlord's traditional duty to maintain common areas log-
ically led to requiring the urban landlord to keep premises reason-
ably safe from foreseeable crime. The court judged the landlord's
compliance by the standard of care that is reasonable in all cir-
cumstances.6 5 The court stated that in Kline that standard re-
quired the landlord to provide the same level of protection as when
the tenant entered the lease because that level of protection was
common in the community.6 6 This requirement, the court ex-
plained, imposed no duty of police protection upon the landlord,
but merely required that the landlord provide reasonable security
measures.6 7 Emphasizing that the duty to protect tenants from
foreseeable crime is not a duty to protect against all possible
crime,6e the court quoted the United States Supreme Court's state-
ment in Lillie v. Thompson that a defendant can be liable for inju-
ries caused by the crime of a third party when the defendant is
"'aware of conditions which created a likelihood' of criminal at-
tack."6 " This explanation of "reasonably foreseeable crime" limited
the possibility that subsequent decisions would rely on the Kline
60. Id. at 479.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 487.
63, Id. at 485.
64. See id. at 481-82. The court noted that in Javins a lease contract created an obli-
gation on the part of the landlord to keep the premises reasonably safe. Id.
65. Id. at 485.
66. Id. at 486.
67. See id. at 483 (citing Goldberg v. Newark Hous. Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d
291, 293 (1962)). The court noted that placing responsibility on the landlord was consistent
with the Goldberg decision, which had held narrowly that landlords do not have a duty to
provide police protection to tenants. Even the Goldberg court stated that "the landlord may
be liable for theft if he carelessly enables a thief to gain entrance to the apartment of the
tenant." Goldberg, 38 N.J. at 588, 186 A.2d at 296.
68. Kline, 439 F.2d at 487.
69. Id. at 483 (quoting Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 461 (1947)).
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ruling to impose unlimited liability on landlords.
The Kline court based the landlord's duty in part upon his
ability-vastly superior to that of the tenants and even the po-
lice-to provide security in the common areas.70 The court also
noted that the landlord's duty arises from the individual tenant's
inability to make the common areas secure.7 1 Although this duty
imposes greater costs on the landlord, the court noted that the
landlord is in a better economic position to make needed security
changes.72 The court reasoned that the landlord could spread the
cost of increased security among his tenants .7  The court con-
cluded: "The landlord is no insurer of his tenants' safety, but he
certainly is no bystander.
'74
B. Trentacost v. BrusseL Warranty of Habitability
Ten years after Kline, the New Jersey Supreme Court went
the next step. It stated in Trentacost v. BrusseI75 that landlord
liability could arise solely from an implied warranty of habitability.
No court previously had recognized the implied warranty of habit-
ability as an independent basis of landlord liability for crimes com-
mitted by third parties.
In Trentacost a tenant sued her landlord for injuries that the
tenant received when she was assaulted and robbed in the hallway
of her apartment building. Although the back door to the building
had been padlocked, the front door had no lock at all.76 Justice
70. Kline, 439 F.2d at 484. The court stated:
Not only as between landlord and tenant is the landlord best equipped to guard
against the predictable risk of intruders, but even as between landlord and the police
power of government. . . .Municipal police cannot patrol the entryways, and the hall-
ways, the garages and the basements of private multiple unit apartment dwellings.
They are neither equipped, manned, nor empowered to do so.
Id.
71. See id. at 480. The court noted:
No individual tenant had it within his power to take measures to guard the garage
entrance ways, to provide security at the main entrance of the building, to patrol the
common hallways and elevators, to set up any kind of security alarm system in the
building, to provide additional locking devices on the main doors .. , and to see that
the entrance was manned at all times.
Id.
72. Id. at 480-81.
73. Id. at 488.
74. Id. at 481.
75. 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980). See generally Recent Development, Expanding
the Scope of the Implied Warranty of Habitability: A Landlord's Duty to Protect Tenants
from Foreseeable Criminal Activity, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1493 (1980) (discussing Trentacost).
76. 82 N.J. at 218, 412 A.2d at 438.
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Pashman, writing for the court, held the landlord liable for the
tenant's injuries.7 The full court agreed that the landlord was lia-
ble in tort for failing to take reasonable security measures against
foreseeable crime."' A three-justice plurality, however, stepped
ahead of former decisions by stating that in the alternative the
landlord was liable to the tenant for breach of the warranty of hab-
itability implied in the lease.79 To support the imposition of an im-
plied warranty of habitability, Justice Pashman, also writing for
the plurality, cited increasingly unsafe urban conditions, 0 the
landlord's control over common areas, the tenant's inability to se-
cure the common areas,8 ' and the landlord's superior bargaining
position.2
Relying on Javins,5 Justice Pashman characterized the urban
apartment lease as a contract rather than a conveyance.8 4 The
court reasoned that a landlord's failure to keep the premises rea-
sonably secure is equivalent to a breach of the warranty of habita-
bility implied in the lease contract.85 The court concluded that the
landlord's breach of this implied warranty of habitability made the
landlord "liable to the tenant for injuries attributable to that
breach."86 Thus, the Trentacost ruling went beyond the definitions
of the scope of the landlord's duty that had appeared in previous
decisions. The court discarded "foreseeability" as a limiting factor
on the landlord's liability. The court reasoned that because the
landlord's implied obligation to provide adequate security exists
independent of his knowledge of risks, the tenant did not have to
prove that the landlord had notice of a defective and unsafe condi-
77. Id.
78. Id. at 215, 412 A.2d at 437.
79. Id. at 224, 412 A.2d at 441.
80. The apartment building was in a high crime area of Passaic, New Jersey. Id. at
218-19, 412 A.2d at 438-39.
81. The court emphasized the landlord's control over security and the tenants' inabil-
ity to provide adequate maintenance such as doorlocks and common area lights. The court
also noted that our "highly mobile society" should not require tenants to invest "substantial
sums in improvements that might outlast their tenancy." The landlord, on the other hand,
can spread security costs over time and among all tenants who enjoy the increased security.
Id. at 226, 412 A.2d at 442.
82. The court found that "[i]ncreasing urbanization, population growth and inflated
construction costs" had created an urban housing shortage that gives landlords superior
bargaining power and makes urban apartment leases mere "form contracts of adhesion." Id.
at 226, 412 A.2d at 442.
83. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
84. 82 N.J. at 225-27, 412 A.2d at 441-43.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 228, 412 A.2d at 443.
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tion to establish the landlord's contractual duty.87 In essence, the
court imposed a strict liability standard on the landlord for viola-
tion of the often amorphous implied warranty of habitability.8
C. Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Investment
Trust: Contract
A third approach that courts take is to consider landlord lia-
bility solely as a breach of contract question. The contract ap-
proach is more conservative than the Trentacost approach because
the contract approach does not depend on a general warranty im-
plied by social policy, but rather on the specific facts of each case.
In Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Investment Trust"9 a ten-
ant who had been raped in her apartment brought suit against her
landlord for the landlord's failure to provide adequate security."
The tenant alleged breach of contract. The court held the landlord
liable for breaches of both an implied and an express warranty of
security.91
The court reasoned that the implied warranty of security had
arisen from an implicit understanding between the landlord and
the tenant that the security conditions which had existed when the
tenant signed the lease would continue throughout the term of the
lease. 2 The court cited Kline for the proposition that an implied
warranty can be the basis of a landlord's liability to a tenant for
third party crimes.9 8 The Flood court, however, failed to recognize
87. Id.
88. See id. Justice Clifford, dissenting from the plurality's implied warranty of habita-
bility holding, harshly criticized the imposition of strict liability. He reasoned that the duty
"should not be grounded simply on a special relationship between the parties but rather
should arise from the particular circumstances of the case, including foreseeability." Justice
Clifford would have included in the court's analysis a balancing of "the relative interests of
the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution....
This [balancing] process has been well served in the past through the application of tradi-
tional negligence principles." Id. at 234-35, 412 A.2d at 447.
89. 503 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Kan. 1980).
90. Id. at 1159. Significantly, the attack occurred in the tenant's apartment rather
than in a common area. Imposing liability in this situation, therefore, is an expansion of the
traditional property principle that a landlord may be liable for damages due to his negli-
gence in common areas.
91. The court stated that "[tihe Kansas Supreme Court has recognized that a lease is
essentially a contract." Id. at 1160 (citing Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304
(1974)).
92. The court stated: "As a result of this [implied] contractual relationship . . . an
implied warranty arises that the landlord will continue to keep the premises in their begin-
ning condition during the lease term." Flood, 503 F. Supp. at 1160.
93. See id. Quoting from Kline, the court noted that "[s]ince the lessees continue [sic]
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that Kline had established a standard of care only for tort analysis.
The Flood court, nevertheless, used the Kline language to establish
an implied warranty of security as an independent basis for a land-
lord's liability under a breach of contract analysis."
Although the Flood decision came nine months after
Trentacost, Flood did not mention Trentacost. Flood based its im-
plied warranty of security on the agreement between the parties
and on conditions existing at the apartment complex itself,95 rather
than on the social policy that the Trentacost court had used as the
basis of its implied warranty of habitability. 6 Thus, in contrast to
Trentacost, the Flood court took a more conservative approach to
the problem of landlord liability. In addition to a breach of the
implied warranty of security, the Flood court also found a breach
of an express warranty of security.9 7 The court concluded that the
express warranty arose from conversations between the landlord
and the tenant in which the landlord had assured the tenant that
the complex was safe and from advertisements representing that
the apartment complex was safe. 8
Thus, the Flood court found the landlord liable by examining
only the property conditions relative to the individual tenant and
the specific exchanges between the landlord and the tenant. This
cautious approach virtually limits the application of each case
analysis to its own facts because the lease terms, both in the writ-
ten contract and orally discussed by the landlord and the tenant,
and the conditions existing at the beginning of each tenant's lease,
will differ with each tenant. The Flood court's contract analysis,
therefore, both restricts the scope of landlord liability and limits
the protection afforded tenants.99
to pay the same rent, they were entitled to expect that the landlord would continue to keep
the premises in the beginning condition during the lease term. It is precisely such expecta-
tions that the law now recognizes as deserving of formal, legal protection." Id. (quoting
Kline, 439 F.2d at 485).
94. The Flood action was in contract, not in tort. The court rejected the tort defense
of comparative fault because the defense is improper in a contract case. Flood, 503 F. Supp.
at 1160.
95. Id.
96. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
97. Flood, 503 F. Supp. at 1160.
98. Id.
99. The Flood contract approach can lead to inequitable results. For example, assume
T*1 moves into a building one year before T*2 and finds minimum security. When T*2
moves in, the landlord improves the security. T*2 thus has an implied warranty of security.
These improved security conditions, however, would not apply to T*1 under the Flood anal-
ysis. If both tenants were assaulted by the same criminal at the same time, T*2 could re-
cover but T*1 could not. This inequitable result shows the flaw of the "pure contract" ap-
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IV. THE EMERGING HYBRID SOLUTION
A. Development of a Liability Theory
The emerging solution to the question of landlord liability for
third party crimes is a hybrid of tort, implied warranty of habita-
bility, and contract law. This Note suggests that such an action
against a landlord is best decided on tort principles.
Holding a landlord liable under an implied warranty of habita-
bility, as in Trentacost, in effect imposes a strict liability standard
upon the landlord.100 This strict liability standard for crimes of
third parties is far too expansive because it imposes liability on the
landlord for conditions that could arise for reasons beyond his con-
trol. The Trentacost standard in effect makes the landlord the in-
surer of his tenants' safety. Consequently, adherence to the
Trentacost rule would encourage a landlord to adopt security pre-
cautions that are unnecessarily expensive. The landlord no doubt
would pass on the unnecessary cost to his tenants in the form of
higher rent.
The contract approach, on the other hand, is too limited in
scope.101 Under the contract standard, landlords may allow secur-
ity maintenance to lapse if no tenant's lease requires the landlord
to maintain adequate protection. Because urban apartments gener-
ally are in short supply, individual tenants are not in a strong
enough bargaining position to demand security maintenance provi-
sions in new leases. In addition, the relatively short terms of urban
apartment leases make cooperation among tenants to secure a
building unlikely. As a result, a standard of determining landlord
liability that relies on the terms of existing leases often will result
in outrageously inadequate security for urban apartment buildings.
Tort is the most efficient ground upon which to determine the
question of landlord liability for third party crimes. The tort
framework imposes on the landlord an objective duty of care inde-
pendent of his contractual obligations, but at the same time limits
the tenant's recovery to injuries arising from conditions within the
landlord's control. The tort standard also does not rely upon out-
moded or changing property law notions, but rather is grounded in
well-settled negligence principles.
proach; this approach ignores the concept that a landlord should have obligations to keep
the premises secure, regardless of specific contractual transactions with individual tenants.
100. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
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B. Duty: The Tort Theory Duty of Care
1. Policy Justifications
Several policy arguments support imposing upon landlords a
duty to keep premises reasonably secure from foreseeable crime. In
today's urban housing crunch landlords are in a superior bargain-
ing position with potential tenants and, therefore, can deny lessees
contractual promises to maintain reasonable security.102 A landlord
also has control of the entire apartment complex, unlike his te-
nants who generally are responsible only for their separate units.103
This central control gives the landlord access to better information
about crime in the area and the level of security needed in the
building. Tenants come and go, but the landlord and his successors
have access to the complete history and current status of the
building.10 4 Thus, the landlord's strong bargaining position, central
control, and permanency make him the most efficient bearer of the
risk of third party crime.
Landlords also are in a better financial position to prevent
crime.105 They can spread the cost of maintenance and security im-
provements by small increases in each tenant's rent. Lone tenants
cannot construct crime barriers as easily as landlords can. More-
over, individual tenants do not have the right, even if they do have
the money, to make substantial changes in the apartment building,
such as installing heavier doors or providing an alarm system for
the complex. 06
The landlord's duty to keep the premises safe did not exist at
common law. This duty, however, is not at odds with common-law
principles because the common law did impose such a duty on in-
dividuals who performed a function analogous to that of the mod-
ern urban landlord. The common law required an innkeeper, the
predecessor to the modern day landlord, to keep the inn and its
premises reasonably safe for guests.10 7 Several courts have ruled
that the analogy between the common-law innkeeper and the pre-
sent day landlord is a good analogy and should set the standard for
102. See, e.g., Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 485 n.20 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Quinn and Phillips, supra note 57, at 225.
103. See, e.g., Kline, 439 F.2d at 480, 484, 488; Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 226,
412 A.2d 436, 442 (1980).
104. See Kline, 439 F.2d at 480, 484.
105. Id.
106. Id.; Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, -, 449 N.E.2d 331, 335
(1983).
107. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
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landlord liability. 0 While the innkeeper was neither a policeman
nor an insurer,10 9 he was not a neutral bystander. Because the inn-
keeper exercised control over the premises, courts charged him
with the special duty of protecting his guests from foreseeable
harm from third parties. 1" 0 The apartment landlord's control over
building security similarly justifies imposing a duty upon urban
landlords to keep the premises reasonably safe.
2. Judicial Recognition
An excellent example of the emerging trend recognizing that
the urban apartment landlord owes a special duty of care to his
tenants is Feld v. Merriam."' The Feld court held the landlord
liable in negligence to tenants who were assaulted in the apartment
building's garage. The court relied on the nature of the modern
urban apartment lease to justify imposing a duty on the landlord
"to provide adequate security to protect his tenants from the fore-
seeable criminal actions of third persons.""11 2 The court agreed with
the Javins court's characterization of the urban apartment lease as
an exchange of rent for a "well known package of goods and ser-
vices"" 3 and concluded that reasonable security protection is part
of that expected package. To evaluate the reasonableness of the
safety procedures that the landlord provided, the Feld court con-
sidered the custom of similarly situated landlords with respect to
security"4 and the specific security measures that the Feid land-
108. See, e.g., Kline, 439 F.2d at 482; Javins, 428 F.2d at 1077 n.33.
109. McFadden v. Bancroft Hotel Corp., 313 Mass. 56, 59, 46 N.E.2d 573, 575 (Mass.
1943).
110. See Orlando Executive Park v. P.D.R., Inc., 402 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (motel liable for guest's injuries from third party attack when attack was reasonably
foreseeable); Zang v. Leonard, 643 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (hotel could be liable
for injuries that a guest suffered when shot in the hotel parking lot).
111. 314 Pa. Super. 414, 461- A.2d 225 (1983).
112. Id. at 427, 461 A.2d at 231. The court noted that the urban apartment lease is not
a conveyance of land but a contract that imposes rights and duties on both landlord and
tenant. The urban apartment dweller, the court said, expects to receive "not merely walls
and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities,
secure windows and doors, proper sanitation and proper maintenance." Id. at 427, 461 A.2d
at 231 (quoting Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 467-68, 329
A.2d 812, 820-21 (1974)).
113. Feld, 314 Pa. Super. at 427, 461 A.2d at 231 (quoting Commonwealth v. Monu-
mental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. at 467-68, 329 A.2d at 820-21 (1974)).
114. Feld, 314 Pa. Super. at 428 & n.9, 461 A.2d at 232 & n.9. The court stated that
other factors in the reasonableness test easily could overcome the court's reliance on land-
lord custom: "[i]f a landlord does not provide locks for the doors in a building located in a
high crime district, his conduct may be unreasonable despite the fact that no other landlord
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lord had employed when the tenants entered the lease. 115 The
court refused to rely on the landlord's subjective view of what se-
curity precautions were appropriate; instead the court used an ob-
jective standard based on what a reasonable person would consider
adequate under the circumstances.
In Scott v. Watson"16 the plaintiffs brought suit against a
landlord for the murder of a tenant in an apartment building ga-
rage. The appellate court, answering certified questions from a
lower court, stated that landlord liability should be based on the
traditional common-law principle that a landlord is responsible for
the safety of tenants in the common areas under his control.""
Thus, the court limited the duty to situations in which a landlord
has control such that he knows or should know of a danger of
crime on the premises."' The common-law principle that a land-
lord must take reasonable precautions to secure common areas,
however, traditionally required landlords to keep premises safe
only from physical and structural defects. 119 The Scott court's ap-
plication of this tort theory to a case of injury from a third party
crime represents a judicial trend toward expanding traditional tort
duty notions in the landlord-tenant setting.1
20
The court in Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc.'
held that a landlord may be liable for the murder of a tenant in
her apartment. The court based the landlord's liability on his duty
to keep common areas safe because the murderer's only possible
entrance into the apartment was by a common walkway adjacent
to the tenant's window. 22 The court imposed a heightened stan-
dard of care on the landlord because of his personal knowledge of
security problems in the building.' 23 The court also noted that
in the area provides such locks." Id. at 428 n.9, 461 A.2d at 232 n.9.
115. Id. at 428, 461 A.2d at 232.
116. 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976).
117. Id. at 167, 359 A.2d at 553.
118. Id. at 169, 359 A.2d at 554; see also Gulf Reston v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 159, 207
S.E.2d 841, 844 (1974) (The Virginia court adopted the same "duty to keep common areas
safe" standard, but did not find the landlord liable for the tenant's death because the land-
lord had taken reasonable care to secure the common areas.).
119. See Note, supra note 24, at 669.
120. For earlier cases consistent with this expansion of traditional tort principles, see
supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
121. 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (reversing and remanding the lower
court's summary judgment ruling for the landlord).
122. Id. at 99, 101.
123. Prior to the murder, the landlord had employed security guards. Id. at 100. In
Penner v. Falk, 153 Cal. App. 3d 858, 200 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1984), the court stated that the
landlord would be liable for injuries caused by third party crimes if the landlord knew of
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shortly before the murder the landlord may have increased the
rent in an effort to improve security.1'24 Similarly, in O'Hara v.
Western Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast2 5 the tenant sought to hold
her landlord liable for injuries that the tenant sustained when an
intruder assaulted and raped her in her apartment.12 The court
recognized the landlord's duty to protect against crime because
"only the landlord is in the position to secure common areas.'1 27
Moreover, the landlord had known of several recent assaults in the
apartment complex.28 The court concluded that the landlord had
breached the duty of care by failing to provide adequate security
and by misrepresenting to tenants the security measures that the
apartment complex employed.
29
One category of landlords arguably owes an even higher duty
of care to tenants: colleges that provide dormitory space or apart-
ments for their students. In Mullins v. Pine Manor College30 the
court held Pine Manor College liable for the rape of a student in a
campus dormitory room. The court reasoned that society expects
colleges to keep dormitories secure.' 3 ' The court felt that the high
concentration of women on college campuses made the risk of third
party crimes reasonably foreseeable.1 2 The Mullins court con-
cluded that because students are transient residents, they lack the
motivation and ability to secure dormitories adequately and, there-
fore, the college was in a better position to protect students against
attacks.'3 3 The court found that Pine Manor had breached its duty
previous crimes and of "tenant complaints that unauthorized persons were often in the
building but [the landlord] ...refused to exclude them or prevent their access." 153 Cal.
App. 3d at 867-68, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
124. Holley, 382 So. 2d at 100. The court found that the rent increase imposed a con-
tractual responsibility on the landlord to provide adequate security. That contractual re-
sponsibility, according to the court, raised the applicable standard of care. Id.
125. 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977). The court reversed the lower
court's dismissal of the tenant's suit.
126. Id. at 801, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 489. The tenant based her charges on negligence
theory.
127. Id. at 802, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 489. The landlord's breach of his duty to keep com-
mon areas secure "could have contributed substantially, as alleged, to appellant's injuries,"
although the assault occurred in the tenant's apartment. Id. at 803, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
128. Id. at 801, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
129. Id. at 803, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490. The court stated that the plaintiff also had a
cause of action for deceit and fraud because the landlord misrepresented the level of secur-
ity in the apartments. The landlord falsely had assured the tenant that the apartments were
safe and patrolled by security guards. Id. at 804, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
130. 389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983).
131. Id. at -, 449 N.E.2d at 336.




to keep the campus safe even though the college had installed elec-
tronic door locks in the dormitories. The court reasoned that the
locks necessarily were inadequate because they did not keep the
assailant out of the dormitory. 34
3. Bases of the Duty
(a) Statutes
Statutes can be the basis of the landlord's duty to keep prem-
ises reasonably safe. In Warner v. Arnold 5' the court stated that a
landlord could be liable in tort for damage to a tenant's property if
an intruder set the premises on fire.3 6 The court determined that
provisions of Georgia's Housing Code had created a duty in the
landlord to provide a suitable living area for the tenants.'3 7 The
court used the Code's "suitability" standard to measure the land-
lord's compliance with his duty to keep the premises safe.'38 The
court, therefore, clearly based the landlord's duty to the tenant on
a statutory foundation.
In Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp.39-the court held that a
landlord was liable to tenants for losses resulting from a foresee-
able burglary that had occurred after the landlord negligently
failed to fix a broken lock.140 The court relied in part upon the
134. Id. at -, 449 N.E.2d at 339. In a case virtually identical to Mullins, a New
York court held that a state college could be held liable for the attack of a student because
the college had failed to keep dormitory doors locked. Miller v. State, 62 N.Y.2d 506, 467
N.E.2d 493, 478 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1984); see also Peterson v. San Francisco Community Col-
lege, 36 Cal. 3d 799, 685 P.2d 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984).
135. 133 Ga. App. 174, 210 S.E.2d 350 (1974).
136. Id. at 177, 210 S.E.2d at 353-54. A burglar had broken into the tenant's apart-
ment and set a fire that damaged the tenant's property. The tenant earlier had complained
to the landlord that the lock on her front door was inadequate in light of recent break-ins in
the area.
137. The relevant portions of the Georgia Housing Code provide:
The landlord must keep the premises in repair, and shall be liable for all substan-
tial improvements placed upon them by his consent ....
The landlord, having fully parted with possession and right of possession, is not
responsible to third persons for damages resulting from the negligence or illegal use of
the premises by the tenant; but he is responsible to others for damages arising from
defective construction or for damages from failur-e-to keep the premises in repair.
GA. CODE ANN. tit. 61, chs. 111, 112 (1979).
138. Warner, 133 Ga. App. at 179, 210 S.E.2d at 353. The Georgia Supreme Court had
ruled that the Code requires a landlord to make the premises suitable "for the use intended
by the lessee and known to the lessor." Point Apartments, Inc. v. Bryant, 99 Ga. App. 110,
113, 107 S.E.2d 684, 687 (1959).
139. 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975).
140. The landlord had notice of the faulty lock because the tenant had complained
before the break-in that the deadbolt did not work. Thus, the risk of harm was foreseeable.
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New Jersey Housing Code as a justification for imposing on the
landlord a duty to provide safe premises .14  The Code required
that doors to multidwelling units have a specified heavy duty
lock.142 The landlord in Braitman, however, had failed to install
the locks on the apartment doors.143 Although the court weighed
heavily the landlord's failure to comply with the Housing Code
provision in holding the landlord liable, the court stopped short of
finding that a violation of the statute was negligence per se. 144 The
court, nevertheless, ruled that violating the statute was significant
evidence of landlord liability.
45
(b) Contract: Express and Implied Warranties of Security
Courts also have relied upon express and implied warranties as
a basis for finding a landlord's duty to provide safe premises for
his tenants.146 A landlord has the duty to deliver the level of secur-
ity promised in advertisements that induced a tenant to rent
147
and the level stated in the tenant's lease. 48 Courts also have ruled
Id. at 371, 346 A.2d at 77-78.
141. The court stated that it also could base the landlord's duty on the "recent judi-
cial trend" requiring landlords to keep premises reasonably safe, or on New Jersey's judicial
recognition that liability can arise for negligence that leads to third party crime. Id. at 374,
379, 382, 346 A.2d at 79-81, 83, 86.
142. At the time of the burglary, the Commissioner of the Department of Community
Affairs had issued regulation N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5:10, § 6.6(d)(7) (1968), which provides
that "[d]oors to dwelling units shall be equipped with a heavy duty lock set equipped with
stopwork for control of the knob and an additional dead bolt... to prevent manipulation
by means other than a key." 68 N.J. at 384, 346 A.2d at 85 (quoting N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit.
5:10, § 6.6(d)(7) (1968)).
143. 68 N.J. at 384, 346 A.2d at 85.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 385, 346 A.2d at 86.
146. See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of landlord liability
based solely on contract.
147. See Flood v. Wisconsin Real Estate Investment Trust, 503 F. Supp. 1157 (D.
Kan. 1980).
148. See id. In a majority of jurisdictions an exculpatory clause will not relieve a land-
lord of liability for harm resulting from his negligence. See, e.g., Armi v. Huckabee, 266 Ala.
91, 95-96, 94 So. 2d 380, 384 (1957); Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1982);
Nashua Gummed & Coated Paper Co. v. Noyes Buick Co., 41 A.2d 920 (N.H. 1945); Jones v.
Houston Aristocrat Apartments Ltd., 521 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); College Mobile
Home Park & Sales v. Hoffman, 241 N.W.2d 174 (Wis. 1976); ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.040(3)
(1975) (only residential leases); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1315(3) (Supp. 1984); CAI. Civ.
CODE § 1953(5) (West Supp. 1984) (only residential leases); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-
4(3) (West Supp. 1984) (only residential leases); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5515 (1975); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 83.47(1)(b) (West Supp. 1984) (only residential leases); GA. CODE ANN. § 61-102
(1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 521-33 (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 15A (West
Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1415(1)(d) (1981); N.Y. GEN. OaLI. § 5-321 (1978); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.13 (Page 1981) (only residential leases); OR&s REV. STAT. §
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that a landlord has a duty to maintain safety standards implied by
the conditions of the building when the tenant assumed
possession. 4 9
In Ten Associates v. McCutcheon5 0 the court held a landlord
liable to a tenant who had been raped in her apartment. The court
based the landlord's duty to the tenant on warranties of security
expressly stated in the tenant's lease.1 51 Prior to signing the lease,
the tenant had asked about security in the complex. The manager
had assured the tenant that the apartments were safe and that the
management employed several security guards. The court found
that these statements created an express warranty of security.'52 In
addition, the court determined that the landlord's advertisements
stating that the apartment provided a twenty-four hour security
service created an implied warranty of security. 53 These express
and implied warranties of security formed the basis of the land-
lord's duty to provide security.
In Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartments, Inc.154 the court in
part based the landlord's duty to the tenant on contract princi-
ples.15 '5 The landlord had charged the tenant an additional five dol-
lars in rent each month purportedly to provide improved security.
The Holley court found that this additional charge created a con-
tractual obligation in the landlord to provide adequate protection
for the tenants.
15
91.745(1)(c) (1983) (only residential leases); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-203 (1982) (only resi-
dential leases in major cities); VA. CODE ANN. § 55.248.9(a)(4) (1981) (only residential
leases); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 59.18.230(2)(d) (Supp. 1984); W.V& CODE § 55-8-14 (1981).
Moreover, courts have ruled that an exculpatory clause in a lease cannot relieve a landlord
of the duty to take reasonable precautions to secure a residential building against crime. See
Cain v. Vontz, 703 F.2d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying Georgia law); Smith v. General
Apartment Co., 133 Ga. App. 927, 929, 213 S.E.2d 74, 76 (1975).
149. See Ten Assocs. v. McCutcheon, 398 So. 2d 860 (Fla. App. 1981). "Building con-
ditions" may include secure doors, heavy locks, guards, and signs stating that a security
service protects the premises.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 862.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. App. 1981).




4. Scope of the Duty
(a) The Landlord Is Not an Insurer of Tenants' Safety
The landlord's duty to keep the premises reasonably safe does
not place the landlord in the role of an insurer.157 Imposing strict
liability upon the landlord, or effectively holding the landlord lia-
ble for all crimes committed on the premises, would make the
landlord an insurer of his tenants' safety.158 Courts can avoid this
overly burdensome result by closely adhering to a flexible standard
of duty under which the landlord must secure only those areas in
which a foreseeable risk of harm exists. 159 This standard does not
require the landlord to build a safety bubble over the premises. It
only requires the landlord to take reasonable security precautions
against foreseeable criminal activity.
16 0
(b) Foreseeability Based on Knowledge of Prior Crimes
Although saddled with the duty to provide reasonable secur-
ity, a landlord may escape liability for injuries resulting from un-
safe conditions if the court finds that the crime was not foresee-
able. Some courts have denied tenants recovery on the ground that
the crimes were not foreseeable because no prior similar crimes
had occurred on the premises.' The emerging majority trend,
157. Kline, 439 F.2d at 481. In other areas of the law, courts have imposed a "duty to
police" on certain parties. See, e.g., Kenny v. SEPTA, 581 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1978) (carrier-
passenger), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979); Dilley v. Baltimore Transit Co., 183 Md. 557,
39 A.2d 469 (1944) (carrier has duty to furnish police protection sufficient to protect passen-
gers from reasonably foreseeable harm); Amoruso v. New York City Transit Auth., 12
A.D.2d 11, 207 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1960) (carrier-passenger); Morgan v. Valley Forge Drive-In
Theater, 431 Pa. 432, 246 A.2d 875 (1968) (landowner-invitee); Buck v. Hankin, 217 Pa.
Super. 262, 269 A.2d 344 (1970) (innkeeper-guest).
158. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text (warranty of habitability).
159. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
160. "Reasonable security measures" depend on the circumstances of each case.
Courts have imposed liability for broken or nonexistent apartment door locks, Cain v.
Vontz, 703 F.2d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 1983), inadequate outdoor lighting, Johnston v. Har-
ris, 387 Mich. 569, 573, 198 N.W.2d 409, 410 (1972), failure to put locks on outside doors,
Trentacost, 82 N.J. at 228, 412 A.2d at 436, nonexistent lighting in common areas,
Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 325, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494, 495 (Ct.
App. 1981), no guards, Holley, 382 So. 2d at 98, untrimmed foliage, Peterson, 36 Cal. 3d 799,
-, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 850, and failure to limit access to nontenants, Penner, 183 Cal. App.
3d at 799, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
161. See, e.g., Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 197-98 (Tenn. 1975) (finding a
business-patron relationship and not a landlord-tenant relationship and holding that be-
cause the plaintiff had not shown evidence of similar previous crimes on the premises, the
assault was not foreseeable); Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 159, 207 S.E.2d 841,
845 (1974) (trespassers' "boyish prank[s]," including redirecting roof lights, making a hole in
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however, is to define foreseeability in terms of all the circum-
stances of the case.16 2 Knowledge of the existence of prior crimes is
just one factor that courts consider.
A majority of courts hold that prior third party crimes need
not have been similar to the crime in question to make the crime
foreseeable.16 3 The landlord in Feld v. Merriam'6 4 argued that he
should not be liable for the assault on a tenant in an apartment
parking garage because, although the landlord had been aware of
criminal activity on the premises, he did not have notice of crimes
as serious as the assault committed against the plaintiff. The court
disagreed and ruled that the landlord's notice of prior, though
"lesser," criminal activity was sufficient to indicate that "criminal
conduct by third parties was likely to endanger the safety of te-
nants. 1 6 5 Thus, the court held that foreseeability does not require
proof that exactly the same crime was committed previously on the
premises.166
Similarly, in Mullins16 7 the college argued that a rape in a dor-
mitory was not foreseeable because no prior rapes had occurred
there. 6 8 The court rejected this argument, preferring to consider
other factors in addition to the previous occurrence of similar
crimes. The court noted that the college's proximity to a metropol-
itan area increased the foreseeability of a criminal act occurring on
campus. 6 9 In addition, the court found that warnings from the di-
rector of student affairs concerning dormitory safety showed that
the roof, and dropping water-filled bags off the roof, held not sufficient to create foreseeable
harm).
162. See, e.g., Olar v. Schroit, 155 Cal. App. 3d 861, 202 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1984); Penner
v. Falk, 153 Cal. App. 3d 858, 200 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1984); Kwaitkowski v. Superior Trading
Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1981); Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apartment,
Inc., 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1980); Smith v. General Apartment Co., 133 Ga. App. 927, 213
S.E.2d 74 (1975); Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983); Feld
v. Merriam, 314 Pa. Super. 414, 461 A.2d 225 (1983).
163. Olar, 155 Cal. App. 3d at 861, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 463 (1984). In Virginia D. v.
Madesco Inv. Corp. 648 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), the court considered an inn-
keeper's liability for a third party assault on a guest. The court analyzed the effect on fore-
seeability of prior crimes and concluded that "[tihere is no requirement that there be at
least one mugging or rape before the innkeeper is obliged to consider the possibility. The
duty is one of the appropriate degree under the circumstances." Id. at 887.
164. 314 Pa. Super. 414, 461 A.2d 225 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 111-
15 for a discussion of Feld.
165. 314 Pa. Super. at 430, 461 A.2d at 233.
166. Id.
167. 389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983). See supra text accompanying notes 130-34
for a discussion of Mullins.




"[t]he risk of such a criminal act was not only foreseeable but was
actually foreseen."17
Strict adherence to a "prior crimes" test of foreseeability
leaves tenants in the building no cause of action against the land-
lord until at least one tenant has been murdered, assaulted, or
robbed. Logic and justice demand adoption of a test similar to the
subjective "dangerous premises" standard 17' applied in Kwaitkow-
ski v. Superior Trading Co." 2 In Kwaitkowski the court held the
landlord liable for a tenant's rape even though no prior rapes had
occurred on the premises. The court reasoned that the occurrence
of prior crimes of any nature was not required for an attack to be
foreseeable.'73 Rather, the court adopted the more subjective dan-
gerous premises test. Under this test, a court considers whether the
apartment is in a potentially dangerous area and, therefore, is a
foreseeable target of third party crime. In Kwaitkowski the court
found that the landlord's notice of prior assaults and robberies in
the area, the building's location in a high crime district, and a de-
fective lobby door that allowed easy access by strangers, all made
the attack on the tenant foreseeable.17 4 Strong judicial support for




Once the court has established the landlord's duty and a
breach of that duty, the court then must consider the question of
170. Id. In a footnote, the court remarked: "The rule requiring evidence of prior crimi-
nal acts often leads to arbitrary results. . . ." Id. at - n.12, 449 N.E.2d at 337 n.12.
171. See Comment, California Landlords' Duty to Protect Tenants from Criminals,
20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 859, 869-70 (1983).
172. 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1981); accord Penner v. Falk, 183 Cal.
App. 3d 858, 200 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1984).
173. 123 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
174. Id. at 333, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
175. See Kendall v. Gore, 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Spar v. Obwoya, 369 A.2d 173
(D.C. 1977); Samson v. Saginaw Professional Bldg., 393 Mich. 393, 224 N.W.2d 843 (1975).
The flaw in the prior crimes standard is analogous to the first year law problem of the
biting dog. See Smith, The Landlord's Duty to Defend His Tenants Against Crime on the
Premises, 4 WHiTTmR L. REV. 587, 608-09 (1982). The maxim "every dog is entitled to one
bite" sounds reasonable. This rule, however, does not hold up under careful analysis. Law
and logic dictate that a dog owner is liable to the individual bitten, even though the dog
never has bitten anyone else, if the dog owner has reason to know that the dog has danger-
ous or vicious propensities. The defendants in Olar v. Schroit advanced the argument that
the "one bite" rule should apply to landlords. The court rejected the contention, reasoning
that the general principles of foreseeability should apply. 155 Cal. App. 3d 861, 202 Cal.
Rptr. 457, 462 (1984).
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causation. A landlord who breaches his duty escapes liability if the
tenant cannot show a causal connection between the breach and
the tenant's damages. 17s The tenant must prove that the landlord's
negligence enhanced the risk of crime 177 or created a situation that
the landlord knew or should have known would afford an opportu-
nity for a criminal attack.77 The tenant, however, need not
demonstrate that certain security measures would have prevented
the crime. 179 The tenant only must present evidence sufficient to
show that the landlord probably caused the event; no tenant can
prove with certainty what would have occurred had the landlord
acted otherwise. 80
The court in Johnston v. Harris"' directly addressed the cau-
sation question. In Johnston a lurking criminal had assaulted and
robbed an elderly tenant in the poorly lit, unlocked vestibule of
the tenant's apartment building. The tenant sued the landlord for
the injuries that the tenant incurred.1 2 The tenant demonstrated
that the landlord had enhanced the likelihood of exposure to crim-
inal assaults by failing to provide adequate lighting and locks.
18 3
Because the landlord's negligence had created a foreseeable risk of
crime, the landlord's negligence was the legal cause of the crime.1
8 4
The court further stated that the act of the criminal was not a
superseding cause of the harm because the landlord's negligence
itself invited that very act. 8 5
176. Clarke v. J.R.D. Management Corp., 118 Misc. 2d 547, 461 N.Y.S.2d 168 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1983). The Clarke court held that the landlord had a duty to provide adequate
security. The court, however, did not find the landlord liable because the tenant had failed
to show that the landlord's negligence had caused the property damage at issue.
177. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 172, 359 A.2d 548, 555-56 (1976); Braitman, 68
N.J. at 382, 346 A.2d at 83-84.
178. Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 574, 198 N.W.2d 409, 411 (1972).
179. Virginia D. v. Madesco Inv. Corp., 648 S.W.2d 881, 889 (Mo. 1983) (en banc); see
Orlando Executive Park v. P.D.R., Inc., 402 So. 2d 442, 448 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981); Mayer v.
Housing Auth., 84 N.J. Super. 411, 425, 202 A.2d 439, 447 (1964).
180. See Orlando Executive Park, 402 So. 2d at 448 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 242 (4th ed. 1977)).
181. 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972).
182. Id. at 572, 198 N.W.2d at 409. The trial court granted the landlord's motion for a
directed verdict and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the tenant
had not proved that the landlord caused the injuries. The Michigan Supreme Court re-
versed, rejecting the lower courts' "narrow[ ] view [of] plaintiff's pleadings and proofs." Id.
at 573, 198 N.W.2d at 410.
183. Id. at 573, 198 N.W.2d at 410.
184. Id. at 573-75, 198 N.W.2d at 410-11.
185. Id. The court based its reasoning on the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
Section 302B. An act or omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of
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The Holley18 6 court adopted a causation analysis similar to the
test that the Johnston court used.187 Relying on the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, s" the court rejected the landlord's argument
that the criminal's act was a superseding cause.8 9 If the landlord
negligently created a risk of criminal conduct,190 the court ruled
that the resulting occurrence of such conduct could not be a super-
seding cause of the injury.'
9'
D. Proposal
Courts have imposed a duty on landlords to secure the prem-
ises against foreseeable crime. They base this duty on two consid-
the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct
is criminal.
Section 448. The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is
a superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's negli-
gent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third person to
commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct
realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created,
and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort
or crime.
Section 449. If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is
the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether
innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not prevent the actor from
being liable for harm caused thereby.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 302B, 448, 449 (1965)).
186. 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
187. For additional cases using a similar causation theory in the landlord-tenant con-
text, see Cain v. Vontz, 703 F.2d 1279, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 1983); O'Hara v. Western Seven
Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 804, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487, 490-91 (1977); General Apartment
Co. v. Smith, 133 Ga. App. 927, 930, 213 S.E.2d 74, 77 (1977); Mullins v. Pine Manor Col-
lege, 389 Mass. 47, -, 449 N.E.2d 331, 341 (1983); Feld v. Merriam, 314 Pa. Super. 414,
428, 461 A.2d 225, 232 (1983).
188. See supra note 185.
189. 382 So. 2d at 101.
190. Id. at 99.
191. Id. at 101. These landlord-tenant decisions are consistent with traditional tort
causation rules. The Supreme Court in Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459 (1947), held an
employer liable to a telegraph operator for injuries she had incurred when an intruder as-
saulted her at work. According to the Court, the criminal assault, even though intentional,
did not break the chain of causation because the attack was the foreseeable result of the
employer's negligence. Id. at 462. The Lillie rule set the standard for determining liability
for injuries resulting from crimes committed by third parties. See, e.g., Liberty Nat'l Life
Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 187, 100 So. 2d 696, 710-11 (1958); Welch & Son Con-
tracting Co. v. Gardner, 96 Ariz. 95, 392 P.2d 567 (1964); Nigido v. First Nat'l Bank, 264
Md. 702, 288 A.2d 127 (1972); Wallinga v. Johnson, 269 Minn. 436, 131 N.W.2d 216 (1964);
McLeod v. Grant County School Dist., 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953); Phelps v.
Woodward Constr. Co., 66 Wyo. 33, 204 P.2d 179 (1949). Thus, adopting the Lillie standard
to determine causation of injuries from third party crimes in the landlord-tenant context is
consistent with established tort principles.
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erations: (1) the landlord's control of building conditions and (2)
the fact that some security measures are needed to combat urban
crime. The courts, however, have not agreed on the grounds of de-
cision. This Note proposes that landlord liability should be based
on tort principles. Other approaches either impose too strict a
standard on the landlord or define his duties too narrowly.
The discussion in part IV of this Note has set out the compo-
nents of the tort action: the landlord's duty of care, the bases and
scope of the standard of care, and causation. The duty arises from
a hybrid of tort, implied warranty, and contract principles. As a
result, the negligence framework is flexible enough to address the
many different issues that arise in actions for landlord liability for
third party crime. This framework ensures tenant safety without
unnecessarily fueling skyrocketing inflation in rental housing costs.
Imposing a duty upon the landlord ensures security maintenance
while limiting that duty to foreseeable harm protects landlords
and, therefore, their tenants from unlimited maintenance costs.
The pivotal issue in landlord-tenant litigation concerning
third party crime is whether the landlord unreasonably created a
risk of crime. This Note proposes that a rebuttable presumption of
landlord negligence arises once the tenant has shown injuries from
a foreseeable crime committed on the premises by an intruder who
gained entrance through a common area. This presumption would
state clearly what many courts implicitly have used to guide their
decisions. 192 The requirement of foreseeability recognizes that the
landlord is not the insurer of his tenants' safety, but requires the
landlord to take reasonably prudent security precautions. The re-
quirement of "entrance through a common area" holds the land-
lord responsible for inadequate security in only the areas that he
controls. A rebuttable presumption similarly would not impose an
unreasonable liability on the landlord. The landlord could over-
come the presumption and thereby shift the burden back to the
tenant by showing that the building did have reasonable security
or that inadequate security was not the cause of the harm. Requir-
ing the landlord to prove adequate security or disprove causation is
consistent with the traditional property law notion that the land-
lord has greater access to information about security needs in the
building.




Courts may base a landlord's liability to a tenant for crimes
committed by third parties upon contract, implied warranty of
habitability, or tort principles. Reliance upon the contract theory
may shield landlords from excessive liability at the expense of te-
nants who may receive inadequate protection. The implied war-
ranty of habitability theory in effect imposes a standard of strict
liability on the landlord that results in excessive security precau-
tions that tenants ultimately pay for in rental increases. The tort
theory balances the adequacy of tenant protection against the bur-
den imposed upon the landlord in providing that protection. Draw-
ing from the strengths of contract and implied warranty theories,
the tort approach achieves this balance through the creation of a
duty upon the landlord to provide adequately safe common areas.
The creation of the duty ensures tenant safety. The presumption,
however, protects the landlord from the potential for extreme lia-
bility because his duty is limited to only reasonably foreseeable
crimes.
In deciding future cases concerning landlord liability to te-
nants for crimes committed by third parties on the premises,
courts should use the tort theory as the basis for landlord liability.
Moreover, courts should use a rebuttable presumption of landlord
negligence that arises once the tenant has shown injuries from a
foreseeable crime committed on the premises by a third party who
gained entrance through a common area.
Centuries ago, building maintenance laws varied according to
surrounding circumstances, including the nature of the area. Re-
turning to that standard of landlord responsibility today affirms
the notion that the law is responsive to the needs of changing
times.
Irma W. Merrill
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